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MARGARET S. HREZO,* PHYLLIS G. BRIDGEMAN,** and
WILLIAM R. WALKER***

Integrating Drought Planning Into
Water Resources Management
Water shortage prevention and mitigation require more than augmentation of available supplies. In many areas of the United States a drought
can result in severe economic loss and human inconvenience when planning for water shortages relies solely on the location and development
of new supplies, because few areas have the resources to keep abreast
of the needs associated with high population growth, increased urbanization, and expanded patterns of water usage. Not only are responses
that rely on traditional water development projects prohibitively expensive, but also they make community growth and change too painful and
costly in terms of these economic and social losses. Planners in other
areas have been able to decrease such losses by devising management
actions to guide the community through a temporary inability to fully
supply all legal users. Moreover, the achievement of those water resource
management goals most frequently mentioned in the water resource planning literature, such as meeting user expectations about future supplies,
reducing waste, accommodating the competing demands of many beneficial uses, protecting instream flows, and satisfying constitutional guidelines for reasonable regulatory actions, will be improved if attention is
given to social and economic as well as engineering considerations.
In order to better incorporate social and economic considerations into
water shortage planning, the Model Water Use Act' advocates the utilization of five planning tools: (1) a declaration of governmental authority
for drought response, (2) mechanisms for automatically implementing
and terminating a drought response plan, including temporary water use
restrictions, (3) notification of impending restrictions, (4) categories and
classes of restrictions according to both source and use with a statement
of preference ranking, and (5)'enforcement of the program by the im*Assistant Director for Research and Administration, Virginia Water Resources Research Center.
**Research Associate, Virginia Water Resources Research Center.
***Director, Virginia Water Resources Research Center, Blacksburg, VA.
1. King, Lauer, Zieglar, Model Water Use Act with Comments, in WATER REsOURCEs AND THE
LAW 533-614 (Ann Arbor University of Michigan, 1958). These authors developed the Model Water
Use Act in response to requests from state legislatures for help in revising their statutes related to
the resolution of water shortage and distribution problems. Its provisions purposely are general to
encourage widespread study and aliplicability. However, the Act covers both surface and groundwater
and outlines a comprehensive approach to water resource management based on a permit system.
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plementing unit of government. This paper analyzes and categorizes the
drought response policies of the forty-eight continental states in terms of
the five criteria found in the Model Water Use Act. The research suggests
that comprehensive drought management may not be possible in most
states because of resistance to water rights restrictions or because of the
perception that drought planning is not an immediate need. However,
many states have adopted those elements most feasible under state and
local political conditions. Important incremental changes for states which
cannot enact comprehensive water shortage plans include designating
drought response authorities, developing well-defined conditions for implementing and terminating use reductions, and formulating appropriate
responses to each set of reduced supply conditions.
DROUGHT MANAGEMENT IN THE POLICY AREA
Many states have recognized the problems of relying solely on the
traditional water law doctrines of riparianism and prior appropriation to
manage drought. Conditions of water shortage exacerbate three problems
inherent to the normal functioning of the riparian doctrine. First, riparianism makes it difficult for users to formulate reasonable expectations
about future supplies. The doctrine does not guarantee a riparian owner
a specific amount of water under any flow conditions, because rights are
defined by a test of reasonableness in relation to all other riparian uses.'
Although the riparian doctrine does require a sharing of water among
riparian water uses during periods of shortage,3 it provides no criteria for
apportioning whatever flow exists. In addition, under riparianism courts
settle disputes concerning allocation only after a riparian user demonstrates harm. 4 This requirement of demonstrable harm not only makes
pre-drought assignment of rights impossible, but also makes enforcement
of rights a difficult and time-consuming process.
Second, the riparian doctrine generally ignores instream flow requirements when accommodating competing needs. 5 In its early form, the
riparian doctrine mandated that any use of the water should result in its
return to the stream substantially undiminished in quantity and quality.
Some commentators have suggested that this natural flow theory recognized a property right in maintenance of the streamflow. 6 Yet the practical
protection offered instream flows by the riparian doctrine exists only to
accommodate the needs of downstream uses,7 not those of fish, wildlife,
2."3" J. -Waters
11 (1936).
3. Davis, Coblentz, and Titelbaum, 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGrHTs § 616 (R. E. Clark ed. 1976).
4. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1977).
5. Hayes, Stream Flow Maintenance in Virginia, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 485, 549 (1984).
6. C. DAvis, RIPARIAN WATER LAw: A FuNCTIONALANALYSIS (National Water Commission, 1971).
7. Id. at 50.
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or recreationists. 8 In addition, the reasonable use theory has replaced the
natural flow theory in most jurisdictions,9 and its emphasis is on reasonable withdrawals for offstream uses, not the meeting of instream needs.
Last, characteristics of the riparian doctrine also limit its effectiveness
in reducing waste during a shortage. Riparianism restricts the use of
surface water to land contiguous to a stream.'" This limitation on the
place of use can lead to waste because water cannot be moved to its
highest and best use even for a short period of time. Further, even during
water shortage, riparianism does not require efficiency in the use of water,
only reasonableness in relation to all other uses. A user is not highly
motivated to conserve water under these circumstances, because the system does not permit the user to directly receive the benefits of his or her
action when another riparian can use water that is saved. Thus, the
common law provides little incentive to reduce waste during shortages.
Several state legislatures have modified the riparian doctrine by creating
statutory preferences for certain water users." One type of statute enacted
early in America's history gives priority to the first millowner on a stream. 2
Ultimately such statutes, or any statutes favoring prior or inplace uses
without regard to the social or economic impact of reduced supplies on
other sources and classes of use, could impair the ability of riparian states
to manage water shortages in an equitable manner by reducing the flexibility needed to meet changing conditions and encouraging waste by
those guaranteed a preference.
Just as reliance on the riparian doctrine of water rights during a water
shortage inhibits the formulation of user expectations, generally ignores
instream flow needs when accommodating competing needs, and encourages the waste of water, reliance on the appropriation doctrine also
poses problems for water shortage management. First, under prior appropriation's classification of water users according to the time when
users appropriate water, only the expectations of senior users receive any
real protection during shortages because the state suspends the supply of
the most junior appropriators. " Unless special preference schemes are
8. R. L. DEWSNup. LEGAL PROTECTION OF INSTREAM WATER VALUES 34 (National Water Commission, 1971); Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, 10
BUFFALo L. REv. 448-49 (1961) Cox, Water Law Primer, 18 (WR1) PRoc. OF AM. Soc'Y. OF CIV.
ENG'G., WATER RESOURCES PLAN. AND MGMT. Div. 107, 111 (March 1982).
9. Cox, supra note 8, at 111.
10. Courts have disagreed on the issue of whether riparian rights extend to land subsequently
added to a riparian tract. It is clear, however, that when a portion of a riparian tract not in contact
with the stream is sold, it loses riparian status unless riparian rights are expressly conveyed. Land
thus cut off from the stream can never regain riparian status even by conveyance to the owner whose
land abuts the stream. Land outside of the watershed of the stream is not riparian even if it is part
of a single tract extending to the stream.
11. Davis, Coblentz, and Titelbaum, supra note 3, at § 614.1-.4 (1976).
12. Beuscher, supra note 8, at 453.
13. Beck and Clyde, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 410.1 (R. E. Clark ed. 1972).
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activated during periods of short supply, the system does not balance
competing demands. It bases allocations on seniority, not a determination
of relative economic or social worth. 4 In addition, prior appropriation
does not base priority on the type of use made; the rule of seniority means
that all beneficial uses are equal under prior appropriation. Although
several western states have created statutory preferences for specific types
of uses, 5 seniority remains a major influence on allocations during water
shortages.
Second, as in the riparian system, the doctrine of prior appropriation
does not consider the effects of withdrawals on important instream flow
uses in the competition for short supplies.' 6 Finally, waste can occur
because the system allows an appropriator to divert more water than
necessary in order to compensate for transportation losses and because
senior uses with low economic potential retain priority and receive full
allocations even if the temporary shortage does more long-term harm to
certain junior uses.
The eastern permit states have tried to remedy the problems associated
with both doctrines. In contrast to prior appropriation laws, these permit
systems generally include greater administrative discretion than is available to regulators in prior appropriation states, and seniority is not a
consideration. Although it is difficult to generalize the content of eastern
permit programs because each results from specific statutory enactments,
these systems generally grandfather existing uses on the date of enactment
and require governmental approval through the issuance of permits for
new uses.' 7 Unlike the appropriation system, these permit programs may
require reductions in use by all permit holders, not just junior users,
during water shortages.' 8 Unlike the riparian system, such programs advise all users in specified categories of quantifiable reductions in permit
conditions when certain restriction phases are instituted.
The legal doctrines applicable to groundwater allocation also constitute
inadequate drought management methods. Neither the absolute ownership 9
nor the reasonable use20 doctrine allows users, by individual action, to
14. Cox, supra note 8, at 112.
15. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-21 (1980) and NEB. REv. STAT. §70-668 (1981).
16. R. L. DEWSNUP, supra note 8.
17. Cox, supra note 8, at 113-14.
18. Id.
19. Under the absolute ownership or English rule, the landowner may make unlimited use of the
groundwater or any use of the land which affects the movement of groundwater without accountability
to others who may be adversely affected. The basis for this rule is that ownership of everything
above and below the land accompanies ownership of the property. Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533
(1850).
20. The American or reasonable use rule replaces the ownership concept found in the English
rule with a qualified right to use of the water. The use must be reasonable not in the amount but in
place of use. The limitations imposed by reasonable use are (1) no export away from the land; (2)
no waste; and (3) no malicious interference with another's well. Forbell v. City of New York, 164
N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623; 74 A. 379 (1909).
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plan for a water shortage or conserve on withdrawals of water with any
expectation of ensuring a future water supply. In practice, if not theory,
the rule of capture2 ' employed by both principles allots water during a
shortage period to those with the deepest wells and the largest pumps.'
Only the common law concept of correlative rights' provides users
with some indication of how water will be allocated in times of shortage
because overlying owners have coequal rights to make reasonable use of
the common supply. California courts have used the correlative rights
concept to require proportional reduction of all withdrawals in certain
cases where use exceeded aquifer recharge capacity.24
Some states have neutralized the ineffective management provided by
the common law related to groundwater disputes by applying their administrative permit programs to ground as well as surface water or, as
several riparian jurisdictions have done, by establishing permit systems
only for the management of groundwater users. In addition, some appropriation states have devised special rules to accommodate conditions
of groundwater mining in which an aquifer is knowingly exhausted and
all uses encounter declining water levels until it is uneconomical to continue pumping. 5 Rules related to groundwater mining thus present an
example of a situation in which water resource managers have effectively
dealt with a problem through administrative action prior to a crisis. Where
groundwater mining does not occur, it is not clear whether appropriative
uses have legally-protected interests in the original water level. The general judicial trend in such cases appears to allow a reasonable reduction
while protecting against unreasonable interference with prior appropriative rights.26
Many states have recognized the problems associated with formulating
user expectations, protecting instream flows, and preventing waste during
droughts solely through their general allocation systems and have modified
these systems by statute. However, this study examined current state
approaches to assess the status of drought management planning in the
United States27 and found that the majority of these policy modifications
remain reactive measures to accommodate emergency situations rather
than advance planning procedures designed to prevent crisis.
21. 78 AM. Jui. 2d, Waters § 164.
22. Cox, supra note 8, at 116.
23. Cox, supra note 8, at 116; Aiken and Supalla, Ground Water Mining in Western Water Rights
Law: The Nebraska Experience, 24 S. D. L. REV. 614 (1979); and Hutchins, The CaliforniaLaw
of Water Rights, cited in A. J. SCHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS INCALIFORNIA, STAFF PAPER No.
2: REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW 3-18 (July

1977).
24. Cox, supra note 8, at 113-114.
25. Id. at 117.
26. Id.; see also R. A. FREEZE AND T. A. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 117 (1979).
27. This section was developed in 1982 and 1983 by telephone contact with relevant agency
personnel in each of the 48 continental states. The cooperation of these individuals, particularly in
reviewing an earlier draft of this manuscript, is greatly appreciated.
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This study of state approaches, sponsored in part by the U.S. Department of the Interior and conducted by a telephone survey of state agencies
and an examination of their drought response policies, suggested a diversity of statutory frameworks, degrees of advance planning for reserve
supplies, and various pressures of unaccommodated growth or changing
patterns of water use. Analysis of state responses focused on an assessment
of each state's statutory framework for responding to shortages as measured by the planning tools identified as important for a water shortage
policy: provisions for a designated governmental authority, specific conditions for implementing and terminating a drought response plan, including usage restrictions, a classification system, and methods of notice
and enforcement. Three general approaches to drought management
emerged: (1) reliance on general water rights systems; (2) adoption of
-some but not all of the planning tools identified; or (3) implementation
of comprehensive management schemes. Fourteen states that rely primarily on their general water rights system meet few of the criteria, but
more than half of the states have implemented one or more of the water
shortage policy tools. However, only seven states have rather comprehensive methods for handling drought-induced water shortages. A description of the three categories of statutory frameworks follows, and
then this article examines other factors influencing the need for drought
management, including an analysis of twenty-one states with either consistent water deficits not defined as drought conditions or seasonal or
localized drought shortages.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 list all of the surveyed states' water allocation systems
and the years in which each state experienced moderate or severe drought,
as measured by the National Weather Service's Palmer Index records
from 1931 through 1979. The Palmer Index is a widely adopted index
based on long records of temperature and precipitation. It measures the
balance between supply (precipitation and stored soil moisture) and demand (such factors as evapotranspiration; water for soil moisture recharge;
and runoff for sustaining streams, lakes, and reservoirs at normal levels),
and then it is weighted by a climatic factor. The result of this water
balance accounting procedure is a computed deficit or excess that expresses moisture conditions for a particular area at a particular time. An
index reading of "normal" falls into the range of 1.0 to - 1.0; readings
of - 2.0 to -4.0 are characterized as moderate and severe drought.
States That Rely Primarily on General Water Rights Systems to
Manage Drought-InducedSupply Shortages
Fourteen states (see Table 1) possessing only a few of the policy tools
identified rely primarily on their general water rights allocation systems
to meet unexpected water supply shortages. South Carolina, Louisiana,
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TABLE 1
States That Rely Primarily on General Water Rights Systems
to Manage Drought-Induced Supply Shortages
Allocation System

Moderate Drought

Alabama
Idaho
Louisiana
Maine

riparian
appropriation
riparian
riparian

Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Wisconsin

riparian
appropriation
riparian
appropriation
riparian
riparian
appropriation**
riparian
riparian

Wyoming

appropriation

1954
1939, 1977
1954, 1963
1941, 1948,
1957, 1965
1963, 1964
1963
1955, 1963
1931, 1935,
1931, 1941,
1954
1951-1955,
1941, 1964
1934, 1963,
1977
1955, 1956,
1966

State

Severe Drought
-

1949,

1934,* 1935
-

1964,

1953, 1954
1954,* 1956
1934, 1936
1965
1956
1965
-

1961,

1934, 1954, 1960

1937
1949
1963

*Indicates extremely dry years registering -4.0 or less on the Palmer Index.

**Indicates appropriation states that follow the "California Doctrine" by utilizing both the riparian
and appropriation systems. The trend in these states is toward elimination of riparian elements.

Wisconsin, Maine, and Vermont do rely on civil defense or general
disaster emergency statutes for drought management in addition to their
water rights allocation systems, but none of the statutes specifically mentions drought as a disaster for which emergency powers are granted.2"
The procedures of these fourteen states for handling such shortages do
not include specific conditions for activating water use restrictions or
sanctions, and only the appropriation states in this category utilize a
classification scheme or make provisions for notice and hearing (see Table
1). However, those classification schemes are based on the appropriation
doctrine's traditional reliance on the seniority of prior uses, rather than
on an actual ranking of use importance. While these states may have laws
affecting water supply and usage, they do not empower any specific public
official or institutional entity to plan in advance for drought-induced
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §25-1-440 (Law. Coop. Cum. Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:604
(West 1975); Wis. STAT. § 166.03 (Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-A, § 57 (West 1978)
and §2614 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §9 (supp. 1985).
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TABLE 2
States With Drought Provisions Which Represent
Emergency Responses Rather than Planning Efforts
State

Allocation System

Moderate Drought

Severe Drought

GROUP 1 (Disaster or Emergency Legislation)
Illinois
Indiana

riparian
riparian

Massachusetts

riparian

New York
Ohio

riparian
riparian

Rhode Island

riparian

Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia

riparian
riparian
riparian

1954,
1931,
1964
1941,
1964
1941,
1931,
1964
1944,
1965
1954
1941,
1966

1963
1940, 1941,

1934

1950, 1957,

1965,* 1966

1965
1953, 1954,

1934

1950, 1957,

1966

1954, 1966

1941
1931
1931

GROUP 2 (Modified Appropriation Systems)
Arizona

appropriation

Colorado

appropriation

Kansas

appropriation**

Nebraska

appropriation**

Nevada

appropriation

New Mexico

appropriation

North Dakota****
Oklahoma
Oregon

appropriation**
appropriation***
appropriation**

South Dakota

appropriation**

Utah

appropriation

Washington

appropriation**

1934, 1947, 1948,
1950
1933, 1935-37,
1963, 1964, 1977
1933, 1936, 1937,
1939, 1940,
1953-1955
1934, 1936, 1938,
1955
1953, 1954, 1959,
1960
1950, 1951,
1953-1955
1937, 1939
1953, 1955, 1963
1934, 1939, 1944,
1977
1935, 1937, 1939,
1977
1934, 1954, 1956,
1959, 1960
1939, 1977

1956
1934,* 1956
1934, 1956*

1937, 1939,
1940, 1956*
1934*
1956
1934,* 1936
1956

1934,* 1936
1977
1944
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Allocation System

Moderate Drought

Severe Drought

GROUP 3 (Eastern Permit States)
Georgia
Iowa****
Kentucky
Maryland
North Carolina
Pennsylvania

modified
permit
modified
modified
modified
modified

riparian
riparian
riparian
riparian
riparian

1954,
1957
1940,
1931,
1941
1932,
1966

1955

-

1953
1954, 1966

1934, 1956*
1931, 1941, 1954
1965

1963, 1965,

1931

*Indicates extremely dry years registering -4.0 or less on the Palmer Index.
**Indicates appropriation states that follow the "California Doctrine" by utilizing both the riparian
and appropriation systems. The trend in these states is toward elimination of riparian elements.
***Oklahoma stream water laws are based primarily on the appropriation doctrine. The state relies
on the doctrine of correlative rights combined with personal property ownership, however, to
regulate groundwater.
****Iowa experienced a very dry period (-3.3 on the Palmer Index) from January through July
1977. However, surpluses from September through December resulted in an average for the
year of - 1.08, which was insufficient to classify it as a drought year. North Dakota had a
similar experience during 1977.

TABLE 3
States with Comprehensive
Water Shortage Management Plans
State

Allocation System

Moderate Drought

Arkansas
California

modified riparian
appropriation**

Connecticut

modified riparian

Delaware

modified riparian

Florida
Minnesota
New Jersey

modified riparian
modified riparian
modified riparian

1955, 1956, 1963
1934, 1959, 1960,
1961, 1976
1931, 1957, 1963,
1964
1941, 1942, 1954,
1963, 1964, 1968
1956
1933, 1976
1931, 1954, 1966

Severe Drought
1954
1977
1965,* 1966*
1931,* 1965,* 1966

1934*
1965

*Indicates extremely dry years registering -4.0 or less on the Palmer Index.
**Indicates appropriation states that follow the "California Doctrine" by utilizing both the riparian
and appropriation systems. The trend in these states is toward elimination of riparian elements.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

shortages. 29 Texas also suspends junior users during shortages, but some
may argue that there are three provisions of state law that could be used
during drought, even though they have not. Texas3" subjects any water
use other than domestic or municipal use to the future possibility that a
city or town will appropriate the water without compensation, except that
international boundary waters are exempt. The state now has two applications pending that would invoke this statute. 3 Two other provisions32
authorize emergency releases of stored water controlled by the Texas
Water Development Board, but these provisions also have not been used
to manage a drought situation.
States with Emergency Drought ProvisionsAffecting Their General
Water Rights Systems
More than half of the states studied have modified some aspects of
their traditional water systems in order to better coordinate available
procedures and personnel for meeting water supply shortages (see Table
2). Many of these plans represent policies for meeting emergencies rather
than either comprehensive planning efforts to mitigate the effects of a
drought before an emergency exists or integrate aspects of their water
supply management frameworks. However, other plans approach the criteria for inclusion in the category of states with comprehensive plans.
For analytical purposes, states identified as having modified their general
water rights system for drought responses are separated into three groups:
1) states that rely on civil defense, disaster, or emergency acts that specifically include drought in their definition of disaster or emergency, 2)
prior appropriation states, and 3) eastern states that have instituted complete or limited permit systems.
DisasterLegislation and Emergency Acts
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia tend to rely on civil defense, disaster,
29. Idaho and Montana suspend junior uses entirely during times of scarcity. IDAHO CODE § 42106 (1977); MON. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401 (1985). Montana does allow state agencies to acquire
permits for instream flow maintenance, but such permits are assigned a priority like all other permits.
Telephone conversation with Matt Williams, Office of the Chief Legal Counsel, Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation, on Sept. 16, 1982.
Mississippi also is included in this category because at the time the research was done that state's
only drought management strategy was suspension of prior appropriators' rights. However, in 1985
Mississippi completely revised its water resource laws. 12 Miss. SuPP., §51-3-1 et. seq (1985).
Since April 1985, Mississippi issues permits for both surface and groundwater that must be renewed
every ten years 12 Miss. Supp., § 51-3-9 (1985). Permits may be modified, Id. at § 51-3-9, but no
mention is made of modification to mitigate drought. Neither does the statute require development
or implementation of any drought management framework.
30. TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 11.028 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
31. Telephone interview with Lori Wrotenbery, Staff Attorney, General Counsel's Office (August
31, 1984).
32. TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 15.325 (Vernon Supp. 1985) and § 16.195 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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or emergency acts that empower the governor or a designated agent to
issue orders and regulations for meeting the exigency." 3 These emergency
statutes do include drought in their definitions of disaster or emergency,34
but only West Virginia and New York provide specific definitions of water
or drought emergency.35 Further, New York has developed specific conditions for implementing its definition.3 6 All these states lack classification
systems and notice provisions, and only Virginia specifies sanctions for
noncompliance.3 7 For the most part, these states emphasize local control
of water shortage responses.38
Modified PriorAppropriationSystems
A second group of states which provide for action during drought by
modifying some aspect of their traditional system of water law is composed of prior appropriation states which theoretically suspend junior uses
entirely when water supplies are scarce: Arizona, Colorado, Kansas,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Some of these states provide for
preferences between competing uses at the time of permit application,39
33. IE. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1108 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-4-1-7 (Bums
1981); OHIO DISASTER SERVICES AGENCY, STATE OF OHIO NATURAL DISASTER PLAN, 1 (1969); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §30-15-7 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-106 (1980 and Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN.
§44-146.17 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 33 App., § 13-8 (West 1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§28 (Consol. 1982); and W. VA. CODE § 15-5-5 and 15-5-6 (1978).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1104(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-4-1-3(3)
(Bums Supp. 1985); OHIO DISASTER SERVICES AGENCY, STATE OF OHIO NATURAL DISASTER PLAN 1
(1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 30-15-3 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-101(5) (1980); VA. CODE ANN.
§44-146.16() (1981 and Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 33 APP., § 13-5 (West 1979);
N.Y. ExEc. LAW §20(2)(a) (Consol. 1982); W. VA. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, STANDARD
PROCEDURES FOR DRINKING WATER EMERGENCIES 1 (1981); and W. VA. CODE

§ 15-5

and 17-2A-8

(1978).
35. N.Y. ExEC. LAW §2-B:20(2)(a)(McKinney 1979)(Vol. 18); W. VA. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
SERVICES, supra note 34, at 2.
36. NEw YORK STATE DROUGHT MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, NEW YORK STATE DROUGHT PRE-

PAREDNESS PLAN 9-10 (February 1982). New York's plan, an appendix to its Disaster Preparedness
Plan, emphasizes local control, water conservation, and a state drought index that uses such indicators
as the Palmer Index, precipitation measurements, reservoir storage, streamflow, and groundwater
levels.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-37.3:4 (1981).
38. New York and West Virginia require that localities (New York) or public water suppliers (West
Virginia) develop water emergency plans once a shortage occurs. NEW YORK STATE DROUGHT
MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 35; W. VA. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, supranote 34,
at 3.
Virginia offers one of the best examples of use of local powers. Virginia's governor has emergency
powers, but localities also may declare water supply emergencies and restrict the use of water by
citizens, provided "such ordinance shall apply only to water supplied by a county, city or town,
authority, or company distributing water for a fee or charge." VA. CODE ANN. §15.1-37.3:4 (A)(198 1).
Such ordinances may include excessive use penalties. In addition, counties, cities and towns may
require the installation of water conservation devices in new buildings and in retrofitting buildings
constructed prior to July 1, 1978. Id. at § 15.1-37.2:1 (1981); and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40,
§41A.
39. See., e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §82a-707(b) (1984) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06.1 (1985).
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but only Oklahoma, Utah, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Colorado specify
preferred uses in situations where all legal uses cannot be fully supplied.4"
Oklahoma, for example, exempts domestic uses from its appropriation
system and gives it preference over all other uses during times of shortages.
Statutory modifications of these states' appropriative principles for situations of short supply are even more important to drought management
than their permit systems. All appropriation states in this category have
modified their general water allocation systems with supplementary drought
procedures. Some examples should indicate the range of approaches used.'
Nevada's governor is empowered to devise contingency plans that provide
any steps necessary to prevent a water emergency or, in the event of such
an emergency, to ensure the most equitable and advantageous use of the
water for all citizens.42 In North Dakota, a gubernatorial declaration of
a drought disaster emergency will set into motion a Drought Contingency
Plan that stresses public awareness programs and voluntary conservation.43 In addition, North Dakota's State Engineer may authorize temporary water uses for not more than a year, if they will not harm existing
rights,' and the Board of Directors of an irrigation district is authorized
to apportion irrigation water equitably when there is a deficiency in supply.45 Oregon's Water Resources Director may order state agencies and
political subdivisions to develop water conservation and curtailment plans
that specify how to reduce nonessential water uses, encourage conser40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.2 (West 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-21 (1980); NEB.
REV. STAT. §70-668 (1981); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §46-1-5 (1983); and COLO. CONST. art.
XVI, § 6.
41. Utah's State Engineer may use regulatory authority to prevent waste in order to mandate
rotation of irrigation water where no use would benefit from a division of the water supply. 1964
Utah Laws § 73-5-9 (1980).
.
New Mexico's laws provide for changing the place of diversion, storage, of use of water if an
emergency exists. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-25 (1985).
Kansas authorized temporary permits (six months' duration) "where the public interest in such
water will not be unreasonably or prejudicially affected." KAN..STAT. ANN. § 82a-727 (1984). The
State Engineer is further authorized to approve the use of water for emergency purposes in order to
safeguard the public interest, protect water quality, or provide an alternate source of supply. KANSAS
STATE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, RULES AND REGULATIONS, WATER APPROPRIATION ACT, DIVISION OF

WATER RESOURCES § 5-3-5a.
Washington enacted an Emergency Powers Bill, 1977 Wash. Laws 328, in 1977 to alleviate
drought impacts, although it was not implemented at that time. This statute gives the governor
responsibility for dertermining the allocation, conservation, and consumption of energy during an
emergency. WASH. REV. CODE § 44.39.070 (1983). In 1982, the Department of Ecology amended
the "Columbia River Instream Resources Protection Program" to establish runoff threshholds below
which curtailment of waters uses will occur when the utility which controls the river for hydropower
forecasts deficient streamflows.
42. NEV. REV. STAT. §416.030 (1979).
43. N.D. DISASTER EMERGENCY SERVICES, N.D. DROUGHT CONTINGENCY PLAN (1981).

44. N.D. CENT. CODE §61-04-02.1 (1985).
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-07-17 (1985).
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vation, prevent waste, reuse water, and allocate or rotate the supply for
domestic, municipal, and industrial use.46 South Dakota's Secretary of
Water and Natural Resources is required to notify the governor whenever
precipitation over a thirty day period during the growing season is 50
percent of normal or 75 percent of normal for sixty days.47 The governor
then may call on a Drought Task Force or Drought Assistance Office to
assess drought damage and recommend specific response actions.4 8
Other nonstatutory drought response procedures have been developed
in some of these appropriation states as well. Colorado has a Drought
Response Plan that emphasizes voluntary conservation and utilizes a Water
Availability Index to indicate the existence of emergency conditions.49
Specific hydrologic conditions require responses from assigned lead agencies, until "unusually complex emergency problems" activate an interagency coordinating group."
Eastern Permit States
Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland. North Carolina, and Pennsylvania
have modified their riparian water law by requiring permits for certain
uses; several elements of these permit systems provide management guidelines for situations of reduced water supply. For example, Maryland's
permit system for all ground and surface water uses except domestic wells
and farm activities allows use restrictions during emergencies and may
require development of conservation programs where existing or projected
demand threatens the water supply's safe yield." However, actual water
supply management and conservation, including management of water
emergencies, are viewed as local concerns. 2
Similar rules apply in Kentucky, where authorities may disregard permit
allocations during droughts and restrict the withdrawal rights of permit
holders. 3 Civil penalties may be imposed on any violator of Kentucky's
water resources law.54 Kentucky's water shortage response program relies
on a system of five phases, each of which provides a water use reduction
goal, options for goal attainment, and discussions of respective state and
46. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.720 (1983).
47. SOUTH DAKOTA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY AND DISASTER SERVICES, SOUTH DAKOTA DROUGHT
RECOVERY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES (1981).

48. Id.

49.

COLORADO DIVISION OF DISASTER EMERGENCY SERVICES, COLORADO DROUGHT RESPONSE PLAN

(1981).
50. Id. at 1.
51. MARYLAND DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, WATER SUPPLIES OF MARYLAND-VOL. I, WATER
SUPPLY MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION 112 (1983).
52. Id. at 100.
53. Ky. REV. STAT. § 151.200 (1980).
54. Ky. REV. STAT. § 151.990 (1980).
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local roles. 5 Primary responsibility rests at the local level until the mandatory allocation phase. 6 The state believes that "while a drought is in
progress, few measures can be implemented by a water utility to alleviate
its effects." 57 Therefore, Kentucky has developed detailed suggestions
for localities including various draft ordinances in order to encourage
pre-crisis planning. 8 Localities are ineligible for state aid during water
shortages unless they have adopted a water conservation plan. 9
Georgia's rules for surface water withdrawals provide use restrictions
according to a classification system during water emergencies,' but these
restrictions and a very general authorization to issue emergency orders
to groundwater users6' apply only to large uses of more than 100,000
gallons per day except for farm uses, which are exempt altogether. Similarly, North Carolina's permit system regulates only large users in "capacity use areas,"'62 but other statewide provisions grant water emergency
powers, including the authority to make emergency diversions to watershort areas which have enforced water use restrictions and the right to
deny such diversions to areas not complying. 63
Pennsylvania requires permits only for public water suppliers who use
surface water sources,' but all such agencies are required during the
normal regulatory process to submit emergency plans.65 In general, the
state relies on a gubernatorial declaration of a natural disaster, which is
defined to include drought occurrences.' However, the Pennsylvania
portion of the Delaware River Basin Commission, which encompasses
about one-third of the state, will be subject to rules now proposed by the
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency in response to a "good
faith agreement" between states in the basin.67
55. Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Kentucky Framework
Water Shortage Response Program (August 1983).
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id. at Appendix B.
58. Id. at Appendix C.
59. Id. at 1.
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-102 (1982).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.13 (1983).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-354 (1983).
64. 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636 (Purdon 1967).
65. 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE. § 121.4 (Shepard's 1983).
66. 4 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 3.31 (Shepard's 1983).
67. The "Pennsylvania Drought Contingency Plan for the Delaware River Basin" (April 1984)
will be activated by a gubernatorial declaration in response to storage conditions in New York City's
three Delaware storage reservoirs, as agreed to by the signatory parties of the Delaware River Basin
Compact. The plan provides for nonessential water use restrictions and the implementation of
contingency plans to achieve specified, phased use reductions by public water suppliers and large
commercial and industrial water users.
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Under Iowa's permit system, 68 consumptive users are cut off when
protected streamflows are reached, but an Iowa Department of Water, Air
and Waste Management policy allows users to divide up the available
flow by time and amount of withdrawal from the protected flow.69 In
addition, the state informally has required municipalities to develop drought
contingency plans eliminating outside watering.7"
Although the states in this group are attempting to manage their water
resources more comprehensively, they have implemented only a few of
the recommended policy tools and only to a limited extent. They have
designated governmental authorities for handling water shortage emergencies whose powers are activated after a gubernatorial declaration of
emergency. Only Georgia has established a well-defined classification
system and notification procedures for those uses which are covered by
the permit system. 7' Kentucky and Iowa have specified conditions for
implementing phases of their drought plans. Although only North Carolina
and Kentucky specify judicial sanctions for noncompliance, Georgia authorities may revoke, suspend, or modify a permit for "any willful violation" of a permit condition.7 2
States with Comprehensive Water Shortage Management Plans
Only seven of the forty-eight continental states have developed plans
for water shortage management that include some form of all of the policy
provisions advocated. These states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, and New Jersey, (see Table 3). In addition,
the Delaware River Basin Commission has an interstate compact with a
fully developed water shortage management plan.
Although these states include some form of all the advocated policy
provisions in their water shortage management frameworks, they have
not adopted verbatim the Model Water Use Act. Rather, they have incorporated the proposed concepts in a manner that reflects their specific
needs and the requirements of their particular water allocation system.
All specify a definition of water supply shortage, a governmental authority
68. Iowa presents a special case compared to the limited permit systems of other eastern states
in that it has appropriated all state waters and instituted a permit system governing uses over 25,000
gpd and certain municipal and industrial suppliers. These users are notified by either phone or mail
of restrictions on withdrawals and are subject to sanctions for noncompliance.
69. O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute-The Constitutionalityof Regulating Existing Uses of
Water, 47 IOWA L. Rv. 549, 576 (1962). This provision formerly was administered by the Iowa
Natural Resources Council, as noted in the Iowa Law Review.
70. Telephone interview with Louis Gieseke, water commissioner, Iowa Natural Resources Council (Sept. 16, 1982).
71. GA. ADMIN. COMP. ch. 391-3-6.07(10) (1978).
72. GA. ADMIN. COMP. ch. 39-30-6.07(9) (1978).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

empowered to plan for as well as act during such shortages, and an
allocation system resting on some classification of supply source and/or
type of use. Moreover, most provide sanctions directly related to noncompliance with the shortage plan and include provisions for notifying
water users of water usage restrictions and penalties for noncompliance.
The weakest element of these plans is the ambiguity of the conditions
specified for activating and terminating water usage restrictions. Primary
responsibility for the design and implementation of these plans rests at
the state level, although the Florida and California laws mandate the
formation of intrastate districts. Several states attempt to incorporate water
shortage planning into their total water resource management process.
New Jersey provides the most recent example of how this group of
states approaches drought management.73 The state began to develop its
regulations after a severe drought during 1980-81 in order to improve the
governor's and the commissioner's ability to manage the waters of the
state during water emergencies. Under these regulations, the governor
declares a water emergency upon a finding by the commissioner of the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection that "there exists
or impends a water supply shortage and/or water quality emergency of a
dimension which significantly impacts water supply, and thereby, endangers the public health, safety or welfare in all or any part of the state."'74
Once an emergency is declared, the commissioner may require water
purveyors to reduce usage of any water supply; utilize alternative supplies;
connect with other supply systems; transfer water; cease using any water
supply; alter passing flow requirements; impose bans on adjustable water
uses; reduce, reapportion, or rotate supplies; cease distribution of their
particular water supply; distribute a specified amount to certain users;
and collect rates pursuant to the emergency surcharge schedule.75
Purveyors serving more than 50,000 residents and any other purveyors
so requested must develop emergency response plans identifying backup
supplies, potential interconnections, interim water use restrictions, and
proposed conservation measures.7 6 In addition, those using 250,000 gallons per day or more, even if self-supplied, also must submit contingency
plans outlining conservation measures and alternative sources of supplies.77
73. New Jersey's plan has been chosen for review because it is the least well-known. Florida
has the most comprehensive plan which includes all five of the suggested planning tools. For a
detailed overview of the states with the most comprehensive water shortage management processes,
see Hrezo, Walker, and Bridgeman, Water Allocation During Water Shortages, in LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS FOR WATER ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 369-89
(Blacksburg: Virginia Water Resources Research Center, 1984).
74. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 19A-1.4 (1985).
75. Id. at tit. 7 § 19A-2.2.
76. Id. at tit. 7 § 19A-3.2.
77. Id. at tit. 7 § 19A-3.4.
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New Jersey's plan contains a four-phase system of prioritized water
restrictions. However, agricultural activities are exempt "unless the governor declares that the public safety and welfare require otherwise."7 8
During Phase I the state encourages voluntary conservation but may also
ban such adjustable water uses as lawn watering, serving water in restaurants, outdoor recreational uses of water, and the washing of streets,
driveways, or sidewalks. 79 Phase II imposes a water emergency surcharge
and limits residential users to fifty gallons of water per person per day.8"
During Phase III further rationing and selective curtailment of industrial
water users take place.. Curtailment decisions will be based on a work
site's water consumption, number of employees, and how essential the
industry is.8 ' If a Phase IV disaster occurs, industrial use will be curtailed
further and selective closings will be ordered. Water service to any user
may be interrupted. 2
New Jersey's plan contains elements of all five policy tools. First, it
delegates authority to the governor, commissioner of the Department of
Environmental Protection, and an interagency task force to manage water
supply shortages. In addition, the plan provides notification and enforcement procedures, and a phased system of reductions separates adjustable,
residential, industrial, and health-related uses. Its weakest point is the
current omission of quantified specific conditions for implementing restrictions for determining a water storage emergency and defining each
of the four emergency phases. However, since New Jersey's plan is
designed to meet other types of supply emergencies as well as droughts,
it would be difficult to formulate triggering mechanisms appropriate under
all conditions.
AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE NEED FOR
DROUGHT MANAGEMENT
As the preceding section demonstrates, many states have not adopted
the planning tools suggested in the Model Water Use Act to handle
drought-induced shortages. Yet per capita water demand continues to rise
in the United States, and twenty-two of the forty-eight continental states
have experienced drought one year out of every ten since 1931. In order
to understand why this situation exists, additional investigation was undertaken of states without comprehensive drought management frameworks that demonstrated two conditions between 1931 and 1979: (1)
average annual Palmer Index readings of - 1.0 or less at least once out
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at tit.
Id. at tit.
Id. at tit.
Id. at tit.
Id. at tit.

7
7
7
7
7

§ 19A-5.2.
§ 19A-5.3.
§ 19A-5.4.
§ 19A-5.5.
§ 19A-5.6.
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of every five years and (2) at least four occurrences of drought. Twentyone states met these requirements (see Table 4). Five additional variables,
i.e., urbanization, irrigation use, consumptive use, total use, and number
of instances of localized drought, were examined to try and provide some
clues on whether or not these twenty-one states would benefit from increased emphasis on water shortage management.
The examination questioned why states experiencing annual soil moisture deficits on a regular basis do not adopt more extensive water shortage
management frameworks than those utilized by these twenty-one states.
One reason for lack of interest could be a small urban population: the
lower the urban population, the lower the demand likely to be placed on
existing water supplies and the less likely there is to be conflict among
domestic, agricultural, and industrial users. Second, low demand for
irrigation water would prevent overall water requirements from rising,
while an increase in irrigated acreage likely would increase the stress
placed on available supplies in dry states. The same relationship is associated with increased consumptive use of water. Finally, one would
expect legislators to react less quickly to the need for new management
tools in states where drought is strictly localized.
The use of Palmer Index data provided an opportunity to develop a
statewide soil moisture average, which yielded some indication of whether
a state would benefit from statewide water shortage management planning.
However, this method also hid important anomalies. First, close examination of the data reveals that most western states, as well as several
eastern and midwestern ones, annually show subsoil moisture deficits,
often as high as - 1.8 or -1.9, and rarely experience the "balanced
state" indicated by a Palmer Index reading of + 1.0 to - 1.0. Obviously,
as population in these states expands, the states could face recurrent water
supply shortages. However, these deficit readings do not reach the - 2.0
level required by the Palmer Index for a moderate drought ranking. Second, the development of an annual statewide drought average hides localized or seasonal deficits. Florida's data, for example, demonstrate
persistent shortages of -2.0 or -3.0 during the first six months of most
years. Sometimes these shortages are statewide; other years they are
localized. Yet the data conceal these deficits by reflecting surplus conditions during later parts of the years. Thus, a water shortage management
framework could be beneficial to states in such situations where there are
consistent water deficits not defined as drought conditions or seasonal or
localized drought shortages.
However, Table 4 suggests that the reasons why states have not perceived a heed for comprehensive drought management provisions are not
correlated with the five variables examined. Arizona, Idaho, Kansas,
Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming record drought conditions at one-third or
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more of their Palmer Index gauging stations at least once every three
years. In addition, consumptive use of water in Arizona, Utah, and Idaho
increased drastically between 1960 and 1980. Irrigation usage and total
usage also increased, and the urban populations in five of those six states
increased by more than 100 percent after 1950. Eleven states in Table 4
experienced more than a 50 percent increase in both consumptive use
and urban population, and population increased by more than 50 percent
in seventeen of the twenty-one states during the period studied. Yet,
despite the existence of conditions suggesting recurrent water shortages,
these states lack most of the water shortage management plan elements
suggested.
Only in Wisconsin, Virginia, and Maine does the balance among climate, population pressures, and water use seem to justify a decision not
to develop a drought management framework. In these states supply and
demand remain relatively balanced. Drought problems exist in these states,
but they are not sufficiently severe to warrant development of a comprehensive management program. Although Maine has drought conditions
every 5.5 years, its total use of water has increased only 16.2 percent
between 1950 and 1980, and consumptive use for the period decreased
41.2 percent. Wisconsin has experienced a large increase in irrigated
acreage and Virginia's urban population is growing rapidly, but these
states experience some type of drought only one year out of every ten.
There are several potential reasons why the five variables examined in
Table 4 do not aid in understanding the motivations of states that do not
implement comprehensive plans. A state's water resource management
system, including storage facilities or groundwater reserves, may adequately cover short-term deficits and thus there is little need for additional
institutional measures for managing water supply shortages. Alternatively,
water resource planning may be so underdeveloped that the need for
improved water shortage management goes unnoticed. However, it appears that clues for why more states have not adopted the Model Water
Use Act's water supply shortage planning tools must be sought within
the states' political environment. First, belief in the importance of local
authority may prevent some states from assuming the lead in drought
management. In addition, classification systems that rank competing uses
and attempts at revising existing allocation systems generate tremendous
amounts of political conflict. Riparian landowners fear the consequences
of adopting permit systems, and one study of appropriation states argues
that "patterns of politics in Western water resource allocation suggest
long-run conflict .... "83 Helen Ingram found "practically no support for
the reallocation of water from less to more economic uses" in the Four
83. Pierce, Conflict and Consensus in Water Politics, 1979 W. POL. Q. 307-319.
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Comers states, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah.84 Further,
she found that concern about water shortages had "no substantial relationship to preferences about water allocation." 85 Even those for whom
water problems were highly salient did not accept reallocation as a solution.8 6
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING DROUGHT MANAGEMENT
These examples show that fear of change in the status quo is a political
reality that hampers development and implementation of drought management frameworks. Recommendations for improving drought management, then, must incorporate this fear of change in water resource allocation
systems if they are to be useful. This means that few states, unless faced
with recurring dire emergencies, are going to adopt the emergency recommendations of the Model Water Use Act verbatim. However, its recommendations remain relevant and can be adapted to each state's particular
needs. Its elements provide a guideline or starting point that states should
consider when formulating or revising their drought management measures. Water resource planners can acknowledge both the relative necessity of drought management and the state's political realities when
designating the governmental level that will have drought response authority, developing specific conditions for activating and terminating plan
implementation, notifying citizens of impending restrictions, and formulating classes of restrictions according to both source and use. We
offer a few general remarks that result from analyzing the data on each
area in order to aid these planners' efforts.
GovernmentalAuthority
Management authority for handling water shortages may rest at the
state, interstate, intrastate regional, watershed, or local levels. Governmental authority to declare a shortage and the power to alter private rights
help assure a specific, even if limited, supply under the emergency allocation guidelines, in contrast to a threatened cessation of supply without
governmental intervention. As shown by the description of current drought
programs, states do not appear to pay enough attention to the locus of
drought management authority. Five states have no institutional frameworks for managing drought." Four rely on the prior appropriation system
without modifying it to handle droughts.88 Five others utilize gubernatorial
84. Ingram, Laney, and McCain, Water Scarcity and the Politics of Plenty in the Four Corners
States, 1979 W. POL. Q. 298-306, 303.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 304.
87. See Table 1: Mississippi, New Hampshire, Michigan, Missouri, and Alabama.
88. See Table 1: Texas, Montana, Wyoming, and Idaho.
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power under general emergency statutes that do not define drought as an
emergency.8 9 The rest use a variety of administrative and institutional
mechanisms. However, in only a few states is there sufficient power vested
in one governmental authority to plan for droughts so that users receive
a certain, even if limited, supply during extreme water shortages requiring
use restrictions. Designation of a planning authority in advance is probably the most important aspect of providing for drought management,
but the location of such authority can be tailored to meet specific state
and local conditions.
IntrastateRegional Authority
One very flexible choice is establishment of intrastate regional authorities in shortage-prone areas. They encourage user acceptance by
assuring interest groups that decisions wil reflect local concerns and that
the balancing of competing demands will be undertaken with full knowledge of the groups' specific circumstances. At the same time, intrastate
boards represent a sufficiently large area to promote the coordination and
uniformity needed to protect water quality and instream flows and to
conjunctively manage sources. Their major problem is one of political
acceptance if interlocal jealousies make regional groupings unacceptable.
In addition, they are susceptible to constitutional challenge as unlawful
delegations of legislative authority to agency personnel, unless their authorizing legislation contains an explicit set of conditions activating plan
implementation and a carefully constructed explication of their powers
and responsibilities. Presently, Florida and California offer the only examples of this management framework.
Statewide Authority
Vesting power to regulate water shortages with the governor or other
statewide offices poses problems unless it is accompanied by an explicit
set of statutory guidelines. The absence of statutory guidelines leaves a
state vulnerable to constitutional challenge based on the charge that legislative authority has been improperly delegated." Further, state officials
are likely to be less familiar with regional peculiarities than, for example,
directors of such regional water districts as those mandated by Florida.
An administrative structure centered on gubernatorial disaster powers
encourages reaction to problems once damage has occurred, rather than
action to minimize damage in advance. This reactive rather than preven89. See Table 1: South Carolina, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Maine, and Vermont.
90. Durand v. Reynolds, 75 N.M. 497, 406 P.2d 817 (N.M. 1965), and Kuiper v. Lundvall, 187
Colo. 40. 529 P.2d 1328 (Colo. 1974) provide examples of and guidelines for judicially upheld
delegations of authority.
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tive posture fosters the waste of scarce water supplies. Therefore, gubernatorial action is best reserved for emergency situations that threaten
to contaminate public water supplies and that require quick, decisive
action to protect the public health and safety. Examples of efficient use
of executive power found in this study include Colorado, Delaware, New
Jersey, and North Carolina. These states provide statutory guidelines for
defining drought, interaction among state agencies responsible for water
resources to ensure availability of adequate information, and involvement
prior to the onset of crisis conditions.9"
Local Authority
The disadvantages of vesting power in local governments and public
utilities outweigh its advantages. The advantages of designating local
entities are that they can react more quickly to a shortage and also have
ready access to the information required to balance competing demands
for local supplies. Nevertheless, lack of uniformity in regional restrictions
is a major problem. Action in one locality may be met with inaction in
another locality that uses a different definition of shortage or a similar
definition, but a different set of conditions for plan implementation. This
lack of uniformity encourages waste and makes difficult the coordination
of such quantity and quality issues as maintaining sufficient instream
flows across political boundaries. Thus, a legislative policy which delegates authority during shortages to local political bodies should be framed
carefully in order to foster coordination among localities,92 uniform definitions of shortages, and complementary categorization of source and
use restrictions.
In addition, placing the burden of planning at the local level strains
local financial and personnel resources. It also may fail to protect threatened water resources, since a local plan cannot protect an aquifer as a
whole or allow for coordinated monitoring of surface and groundwater
supplies. Moreover, a local water shortage plan cannot resolve questions
of whether shortage plans or zoning ordinances should take precedence
in any conflict. Overall, perhaps the best role for local governments is
to aid the implementation of intrastate, regional, or district plans by
enacting conservation-oriented building codes, providing the means for
effective public participation and notice, implementing conservation education programs, helping to design utility rate structures which encourage
conservation, and developing land use plans which include conservation
91. See discussions of these states accompanying Tables 2 and 3.
92. For instance, the Connecticut Department of Public Utilities may require interconnections
between water companies to relieve site-specific water shortages. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262K
(West Supp. 1985).
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efforts. States that have the potential to effectively combine state and
local authority are Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
InterstateAuthority
Few interstate commissions and compacts are likely to be established
because interstate rivalries present severe political obstacles to their formation. However, an interstate approach can minimize waste, maximize
flow maintenance, protect water quality, and enhance the conjunctive
management of supply sources if a shortage situation is recognized in
time. A well-publicized plan assures users a secure supply and provides
a concrete set of rules for planning purposes. Both the Delaware River
Basin Compact93 and the Potomac River Low Flow Agreement demonstrate the benefits of this approach. The Potomac River agreement, for
example, specifies three stages: alert, restriction, and emergency, based
on the percentage effect of total daily withdrawals on the total daily flow.
During the restriction and emergency stages, each party receives a fractional share of its average winter use rate over five years."4 However, in
regions where shortages are localized, the organization of interstate commissions and compacts may represent an extreme response that lessens
flexibility and increases administrative costs.
Conditions Requiring Plan Implementation
Delineation of a precise definition of "water shortage" and a set of
specific conditions for implementing and terminating a drought response
plan, including its water use restrictions, minimizes the threat of a court
declaring the emergency regulations invalid as an arbitrary or capricious
abuse of administrative discretion. Failure to adequately delineate the
boundaries of regulatory authority could create situations in which administrators postpone action in order to avoid conflict with user groups
and, thus, lessen the protection afforded water quality and supplies. Specific conditions also provide users with the information necessary to make
contingency plans and decisions on future economic investments.
Even the policies of those states which are most advanced in planning
for shortages could improve their definitions of water shortages and their
designation of conditions for implementing and terminating response measures. Such conditions as those used in Colorado, Kentucky, Florida,
New York, and the Potomac River Low Flow Allocation Agreement or
93. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961); DELAwARE RIVER
BASIN COMMISSION, INTERSTATE WATER MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PARTIES TO THE

U.S. SUPREME COURT DECREE OF 1954 TO THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION PURSUANT TO
COMMISSION RESOLUTION 78-20 (1982).
94. Potomac River Low Flow Agreement, article 2-B, (1978).
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the operations curves established by the Delaware River Basin Commission provide definite, quantitative conditions for activating shortage responses without losing needed flexibility. 95 These mechanisms tie shortage
declarations to well-defined indices, such as the Palmer Index, instream
flows, evaluation of historical data in terms of present and anticipated
user needs, degree of subsidence or saltwater intrusion, potential for
irreversible adverse impacts on fish and wildlife, and reservoir or groundwater conditions as defined by the number of days of supply remaining.
Several other states also have good definitions of drought that could be
used as the basis for setting implementation conditions: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, New Jersey, and West Virginia. 96
Notification
Once a shortage occurs and the plan is implemented, water users must
be notified of the plan's activation and its impact on their activities during
the specific restriction phase imposed. Courts consistently have interpreted the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require
notice prior to "the deprivation of property." Since few states have comprehensive drought management plans, there also are few provisions
regarding notification. Prior notification of a use restriction scheme is
most effective when it includes full information on the proposal, the
availability of variances, and the procedure for acquiring a variance. North
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida provide examples of good notification
procedures. 97 Notification procedures also are part of the permitting process in most appropriation states.98
Classification and Categories
Legislative formulation of categories and classes of restrictions according to some set of ranking for both use and source can reduce unguided administrative discretion. In addition, knowledge that an activity
will be among the first uses restricted or that a certain amount of water
will be available in particular situations helps investors to calculate fi95. For example, Colorado uses a "Water Availability Index" that considers specific hydrologic
conditions and automatically triggers responses from assigned lead agencies until "unusually complex
problems" activate an Interagency Coordinating Group. New York has developed a state drought
index that uses such indicators as the Palmer Index, precipitation measurements, reservoir storage,
streamflow, and groundwater levels. Local drought management options then are specified for each
stage.
96. For example, in West Virginia, a water emergency exists whenever "the capabilities of a
public water supplier are unable to meet the minimum needs of its customers, with a resulting health
or fire hazard." WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, supra note 34, at 2.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-354(b) (1983); GA. CODEANN. § 12-5-31 (1) (1982); and FLA. STAT.

§ 373.246(5) and (6) (1985).

98. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT.

§537,420

(1983).
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nancial risks and to make investment choices. Advance categorization of
water resources by source and use provides accurate information on the
status of existing water supplies and thus can be combined with conservation plans to reduce waste of scarce supplies and to protect water
quantity and quality.
Few riparian states have developed classification systems for source
of supply or type of use. However, most of the states studied that have
seriously attempted to meet exigency needs have developed at least a
preference system, if not a genuine scheme for classifying sources and
uses." Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, and New Jersey provide good
examples of classification systems for managing drought-induced water
shortages."° Adoption of some classification system or a predetermined
set of across-the-board phased reductions should be given serious attention
in the framing of any water shortage legislation in order to avoid challenges that the system deprives individual users of property, to allow the
formulation of user expectations, and to accommodate competing interests. This suggestion also applies to appropriation states.
Sanctions
In most states, public utilities are responsible for imposing penalties
for noncompliance and often develop them on an ad hoe basis, usually
in the midst of a water crisis. Advance notice of meaningful penalties
that will be enforced, such as those expressed in the laws of Arkansas
and Florida,'01 promotes user expectations of compliance and, therefore,
reduces waste. However, economic disincentives such as water emergency surcharges or graduated rate structures seem better able than penal
statutes to encourage cooperation. 102
CONCLUSION
This study of state drought responses demonstrates that use of the Model
Water Use Act's planning tools need not adhere to any particular model
99. Arkansas, Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey, California, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania,
Nebraska, Utah, Colorado, and South Dakota.
100. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 105.41(la) (1985).
101. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1313 (SUPP. 1985); FLA. STAT. § 373.613 (1974) and FLA. STAT.
§ 373.136 (1974).
102. New Jersey recently adopted such a regulation. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 19B-l.5(a)(1985)Water Emergency Surcharge Schedule:
"I. During Phase II of a water emergency the normal water rate shall be charged residential users
for the first 50 gallons per capita used daily. Any water used above the prescribed amount in each
billing period shall be charged the normal rate plus a $5 surcharge for each additional 100 cubic
feet or portion thereof."
"2. During Phase II of a water emergency non-residential users of water shall be charged the
normal water rate plus 0.33 times the normal rate as a surcharge. This rate may be increased at the
discretion of the Drought Coordinator should Phase II continue or should desired conservation levels
not be met."
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or result in rigid bureaucratization of the drought management process.
There is no ideal drought management plan. Flexible procedures matching
state needs are the keys to successful management in water resources as
in other areas." 3 What is needed depends on a state's physical environment and the excellence of its water supply planning effort. What is
feasible depends on state and local political conditions. Incremental change
may be all that is possible or necessary." ° In such situations, perhaps,
efforts should be concentrated on specifying the conditions that will activate the drought management plan and developing appropriate responses
for each set of supply conditions. Responses should include planned water
use reductions even if not implemented by some ranking of uses. The
need may not be to have a comprehensive plan but to have in place
designated authorities and agreed-upon responses prior to the occurrence
of a drought emergency. Additional attention to the tools discussed can
result both in better drought preparedness and increased coherence in the
state's total management of water resources. There are many ways, however, of attaining this goal.

103. Courts also recognize the importance of flexible programs focusing on actual conditions.
They have upheld such widely varying practices as the overdraft concept, City of Frisco v. Texas
Water Rights Commission, 579 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); the consideration of additional
factors besides maximum beneficial use in granting or denying permits, City of St. Petersburg v.
Southwest Florida Water Management District, 355 S.2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); and rules
requiring expensive retrofitting with conservation devices, Garvar v. New York City, 54 Misc. 2d
562, 282 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1967).
104. In particular, states considering the adoption of a permit system need to pay attention to
how any changes affect existing water rights. Courts in most appropriation and permit states have
received frequent requests to define vested rights. See, for example, Wright v. Texas Water Rights
Commission, 445 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ App., 1969); State Board of Engineers v. Slaughter, 407
S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966); Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (Neb. 1903); and
Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (Neb. 1966).

